Introduction
Decentralization efforts in developing countries in recent decades have led to an extensive literature on the causes and consequences of both centralization and decentralization. While recent studies followed a comparative perspective and showed similarities and differences between the decentralization efforts in a variety of developing countries, countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and Turkey are largely left out of those comparisons (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006) .
Among the developing countries that have liberalized their economies, Turkey has gone through significant decentralization in its government structure since the early 1980s. As the ongoing political and economic reforms in Turkey enter a new era, the country is preparing to deal with its prospective entry into the European Union (EU).
Joining the EU is likely to place heightened demands on the public administration system of Turkey. For Turkey to meet European Union (EU) standards of service delivery there is an urgent need for investment in local infrastructure systems. However, it was impossible for local governments to meet the challenge with the archaic local government sector laws and regulations. Recognizing the need for reforming the local government sector, the government has announced an ambitious reform plan and prepared various legislations.
In this paper, we examine economic development and growth in Turkish provinces. While there is a rich literature on the economic effects of government decentralization from both developed and developing countries, these effects have not been examined widely within the context of Turkish local governments. We first give an overview of the local government structure and recent reform efforts. We then provide an empirical analysis of the effects of decentralization on economic development and growth in Turkish provinces using cross-sectional and panel data approaches. Our panel dataset consists of 67 provinces over a period from 1976 to 2001. We examine specifically if variations in local decentralization across these provinces and across time have had a significant impact on economic development and growth. We find mixed results from our analysis of decentralization in Turkish provinces. First, creation of new provinces by separation from existing provinces seems to have had no significant impact on development or growth in those existing provinces. On the other hand, decentralization through increase in the number of local governments per capita seems to have had a negative effect on the level economic development.
Literature on Decentralization
Decentralization is seen as an important avenue for efficiency gains by enabling a direct link between local provision of services and local tastes (Oates 1972 (Oates , 1993 . It is then expected that decentralization helps promote economic growth. Numerous studies examined empirically the relationship between decentralization and economic growth. 1 Among these Davoodi and Zou (1998) used a panel of 46 developed and developing countries for the period 1970-1985 and found a negative relationship between fiscal decentralization and growth in developing countries and no significant relationship for the developed countries. China has been a popular case study due to its sweeping fiscal reforms to decentralize since late 1970s. Zhang and Zou (1998) 
examined a panel of 28
Chinese provinces during the period 1980-1992 and found a negative relationship between decentralization and growth. Xie, Zou and Davoodi (1999) found a similar relationship for the U.S. after examining time series data from 1948 to 1994. Other studies conflicted these findings by showing evidence of a positive relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth. For example, Lin and Liu (2000) found evidence of a positive relationship for the same Chinese provinces used by Zhang and Zou (1998) after taking into account other concurrent reforms. In a pioneering study on fiscal decentralization in Turkey, Neyapti (2005) examined the links between fiscal decentralization and socio-economic indicators in Turkish provinces. Overall, she found a favorable impact of fiscal decentralization, with a positive relationship with the level and growth rate of output. Neyapti's empirical analysis was constrained, however, by data limitations regarding the fiscal decentralization data that only allowed cross-sectional analyses for the years 1995 and 1998.
In another study, Akai and Sakata (2002) pointed to the importance of controlling for historical or cultural differences between observations and using a period of relatively lower growth in a decentralization study. To improve on the data problems of other studies, they used data from 50 U.S. states for the period 1992-1996. They found evidence of positive contribution of fiscal decentralization to economic growth. In a recent study, Stansel (2005) extended the local government empirical literature by examining the link between local decentralization and local economic growth using a new dataset of 314 U.S. metropolitan statistical areas. He found a negative and significant relationship between the central city share of metro population and population and real per capita income growth and a positive and significant relationship between the number of county governments per resident and population and real per capita income growth. Hence, his study shows evidence of a positive relationship between local decentralization and metropolitan statistical area economic growth. After reviewing a variety of past studies on decentralization and economic growth, Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) concluded that there is no empirical consensus on the relationship between decentralization and economic growth.
Recent Decentralization Efforts in Turkey
Historically, the Turkish public administration system has had a very strong centralist orientation. Local governments have long been subjected to a strong administrative and financial tutelage. This emphasis on strong central administration was inherited from the Ottoman Empire and has been reinforced by the Turkish Republic as part of the national modernization process.
2 However, recognizing the increasing demands from citizens for better service delivery and to increase its chances for opening of European Union membership negotiations, the Turkish government announced an ambitious public sector reform package in 2002. Decentralization of decision-making power and development of modern local government system was the fundamental component of the government's reform plan. Accordingly, the government has proposed and the Parliament has enacted several local government reform laws updating outdated local government laws, some of which were from the Ottoman Empire times.
The local government system in Turkey has been organized as special provincial administrations (SPA), districts, villages, metropolitan municipalities and municipalities.
SPA is an "intermediate-level" local government unit operating at provincial level. SPAs provide services to both urban and rural areas. The main responsibility areas of SPAs include education, health, police, infrastructure, agriculture, rural services, industry and trade. They also have the responsibility for providing environmental development plan, roads, water, sewage, solid waste, environment, emergency, culture, tourism, youth and sports, forestation, parks and recreation services outside of municipal boundaries.
Currently, there are 81 provinces covering the whole territory of the country. For administrative purposes, provinces are subdivided into districts (ilce), which in turn are divided into communes (villages).
The number of provinces has changed several times in the past. The second type of local governments is a municipality. Municipalities are the decentralized local government units. They provide municipal services only in urban areas within provincial boundaries. The number of municipalities has increased significantly in the last two decades (see Table 2 ). At the present time, there are 3,225 municipalities of which 16 are metropolitan municipalities, 100 are district municipalities in metropolitan municipality jurisdictions, 283 are district level first degree municipalities, 65 are provincial municipalities, 750 are district municipalities and 2,011 are township municipalities. However, municipal population is concentrated in several large cities, leaving a large majority of municipalities with very small populations (see Table 3 ). Currently, more than half of the population (53.6 percent) lives in 122 municipalities. More than 2,000 municipalities, which are more than 60 percent in terms of number of municipalities, have population less than 5,000. In other words, while the number of municipalities with less than 5,000 people makes up 62 percent of all municipalities; their population totals only 11 percent of the total population. The average population settled in municipalities is 16,643.
With the increase of the number of municipalities over time, their size decreased and created issues of economies of scale and scope in service delivery. According to Keles, politicians encouraged establishment of new municipalities because of central government grants to localities (Keles 2000) . Ruling parties at the center were reluctant to enforce minimum population criterion, which was set to 2,000, in fear of losing Municipalities are not distributed across the country uniformly. The distribution of number of municipalities across regions is skewed toward the west, reflecting migration trends in the country. Municipalities by population and region are depicted in Table 4 .
Five population categories are: (1) population less than 5,000; (2) population 5,000-20,000; (3) population 20,000-50,000; (4) population 50,000-100,000; and (5) population more than 100,000; and metropolitan municipalities. Some of the stylized facts are:
41.4% of the municipal population lives in metropolitan municipalities. 71% of the municipalities in Central Anatolia and 49% of the municipalities in Southwest Anatolia have populations less than 5,000. Municipalities with more than 100,000 people are only 3.3% of the municipality number. Marmara region is the only region with more than 35 percent of municipalities with population more than 100,000. The metropolitan municipal population in Marmara region makes up 67.7% of all municipal population; furthermore its share in the region's total population is 83.1%. the increase in the population threshold to establish a municipality to 5,000 from 2,000.
The reason for this change is to reap the benefits of economies of scale in service delivery. However, this new increased threshold applies to establishment of new municipalities; it does not apply to existing municipalities that are above the minimum threshold of 2,000 (the minimum population criterion under the previous legislation).
In Turkey, there is a two-tier municipal system in 16 large cities. In these cities, metropolitan municipalities were established in 1984 because of increasing demand for urban service due to high urbanization rates. As part of its reform efforts, the government 
Data and Empirical Approach
As noted by Ebel and Yilmaz (2003) , there are serious problems with the measurement of decentralization, due mainly to imperfect data generation in developing countries. Measuring decentralization at the province level is even more problematic than it is at the national level. One way to overcome data issues is to look at differences in the number of local governments across provinces and also across time. Recent studies from the U.S. used this type of decentralization measure to examine the economic impacts of decentralization (Zax, 1989; Stansel, 2005; Hammond and Tosun, 2006) . Zax (1989) used two measures, number of local governments per capita and number of local governments per square mile of land. While the former is used as a measure of the degree of scale economies, the latter can be seen as a measure of competition between local governments in the Tiebout sense. 3 Hammond and Tosun (2006) followed the empirical approach by Zax in their analysis of decentralization in the metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties in the U.S.
We also follow Zax and use number of local governments per capita and number of local governments per square mile of land as main decentralization variables. Hence our decentralization variables are more local political fragmentation indicators than fiscal decentralization measures. We should note, however, that the two are highly correlated and the literature used both as measures of decentralization. We also examine creation of new provinces by separation from existing provinces starting in 1989 using a dummy variable (Separation) that is equal to one for the years after separation and zero before separation. We would expect separation to have a positive economic impact on the existing original provinces if decentralization is thought to enhance efficiency in public service provision.
We conduct our empirical analysis in two parts. First, we examine recent decentralization through changes in number of local governments (per capita and per square kilometer) by including observations from 1976 to 2001. However, we limit our analysis to the original 67 provinces to maintain data consistency throughout the entire period of study. To understand the effect of local decentralization on economic activity and development, we regress provincial gross domestic product per and annual growth rate in provincial GDP per capita on a number of explanatory variables including a dummy variable indicating creation of new provinces by separation from existing ones (Separation), number of municipalities (per capita and square kilometer of land), land area, total number of vehicles, and province and time fixed effects. The main data source for these variables is the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK).
4
In the second part of the empirical analysis, we examine cross-sectional variation in decentralization across the current total of 81 Turkish provinces. 5 We picked 2000 as the year of analysis, which is the most recent data year before the 2001 financial crisis in Turkey. In these regressions, we also use "provincial development index" as another 4 We use provincial GDP data of 2000 as the basis of analysis. However, TURKSTAT introduced a fourth revision to the GDP series and updated the base year to 1998 from 1987. Revised provincial GDP data do not exist yet. Since our analysis covers the period between 1976 and 2001 we believe that this change has a limited impact on the results. 5 From 1989 to 1999 fourteen new provinces are created by separation from other existing provinces (see Table 1 ). dependent variable. 6 We add share of urban population as another explanatory variable.
On the other hand, we cannot use provincial and time fixed effects due to cross-sectional data. Instead, we use regional dummies to control for specific regional effects. Again, our main data source is TUIK. Provincial development index is provided by the Turkish State Planning Organization (DPT).
Empirical Method and Results

Methodology
We use regression analysis to estimate the effect of local government For the cross-sectional regression analysis with the current number of 81 provinces, we also control for the spatial correlation in economic activity between contiguous provinces. Summary statistics for these regressions are shown in Table 6 .
First introduced by Cliff and Ord (1981) and Anselin (1988) , models of spatial dependence account for any direct influence of spatial neighbors, spillover effects, and externalities generated between cross-sectional observations (in this research the unit of observation is province). Failing to address spatial dependence may lead to biased, inefficient, and/or inconsistent coefficient estimates. In order to test for spatial autocorrelation in the data, we conducted diagnostic tests using data for a cross-section of 81 provinces in 2000. For this, we created a spatial weights matrix that shows the presence of potential spatial interaction between neighboring provinces. We ran diagnostic tests for both the spatial error and spatial lag models (Anselin et al., 1996) . In a spatial error model there is an autoregressive process in the error term, whereas a spatial lag model assumes a spatially lagged dependent variable. Lagrange multiplier test statistics are used to test the null hypothesis that autoregressive parameters are equal to zero. 7 The null hypothesis is rejected, indicating the presence of spatial autocorrelation, particularly in the case of spatial lag model.
Spatial dependence is caused by the existence of spillover effects between units of observation (provinces) and the presence of a direct influence from activity in one province on neighboring provinces. In this case, it may be that economic activity measured by GDP in one province affect GDP per capita in neighboring provinces. We therefore run separate regressions using the spatial lag model.
Results
Empirical results are provided in Tables 7 and 8 . We start in Table 7 Anselin et al. (1996) for a detailed explanation of these tests.
come from regressions with growth rate in GDP per capita as the dependent variable. In the first column, we show the results where decentralization through creation of new provinces by separation from existing provinces is examined through a dummy variable called "Separation" where Separation is 1 for the years after separation in the provinces that experienced separation and 0 before. We model this regression using the fixed effects two-stage least squares procedure since separation is likely an endogenous phenomenon.
Using the Metrocity dummy and midyear population as instruments, we find that while Separation has a positive coefficient, it is not statistically significant. In the second column, we replaced Separation with the log of number of municipalities per capita as our key decentralization variable. Here, we find that decentralization is negatively and statistically significantly associated with GDP per capita. This would support the view that decentralization limits economic benefits from economies of scale in public service provision. We get a similar result in column (3) when we replace log of municipalities per capita with log of municipalities per square kilometer of land. Hence we find either no or negative effect of decentralization on level of GDP per capita. Economic growth regressions in the remaining columns in Table 6 show negative coefficients for our decentralization variables but none of these are statistically significant. Hence we cannot confirm any significant effect of decentralization on the economic growth rates in the provinces. Among other control variables in the regressions, we find that total vehicles per capita has positive and significant association with GDP per capita and GDP growth in almost all regressions. The Metrocity dummy also has a positive and significant coefficient in two of the GDP per capita regressions.
We now turn to cross-sectional spatial regressions in Table 8 . In the first two columns, we examine the relationship between our decentralization variables and the level of GDP per capita, similar to our approach in Table 7 . One difference is we focus on number of municipalities per capita and per square kilometer of land. While we get a negative coefficient for the regression with number of municipalities per capita in column
(1), the coefficient for the number of municipalities per square kilometer turns positive in column (2). In both cases, however, we lose statistical significance. When we use provincial development index instead of GDP per capita, we find significant results for the decentralization variables. In column (3) we find that there is a negative and significant association between the number of municipalities per capita and the development index, similar to what we found in column (2) of Table 7 . In column (4) there is now a positive and significant association between the number of municipalities Being a metrocity seems to have a positive and significant association with economic development in the last two regressions. Results for the regional dummies show that Marmara Region, in particular, has a significantly higher development level compared to the omitted region dummy for the Central Anatolia Region.
Summary and Conclusions
It is important to examine the impact of past decentralization in Turkey as the country is going through significant reforms, including public administration reform (1) Population less than 5,000 (2) Population between 5,000 and 20,000 (3) Population between 20,000 and 50,000 (4) Population between 50,000 and 100,000 (5) Population more than 100,000 Standard errors in parentheses. Dummy for Central Anatolia Region is omitted to avoid the dummy variable trap. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
